Kent State

I wonder how many generation X-ers and Millenials have heard of the Kent State shootings.

I must ask my kids.

At the time it happened I was on operation Concrete somewhere near the border of Long Khanh and Phuoc Provinces.

I remember hearing about the shootings on AFVN radio.

Back then, it seemed impossible that American Uni students could be killed by gunfire from National Guard troops in the sanctuary of their university.

Given the bloody history of shootings, both institutionalised and criminal, in the US since, it no longer seems remarkable.

I was listening to Neil Young the other day, and the song triggered some memories.

I will, gentle reader, share them with you, with two fervent hopes.

The first is that if you were around in May 1970 that you were living in peace and harmony and that the memories are good ones.

The second is that we never see the likes of that again, here, or in the US.

Anyway, enjoy the music..........

Update: I did ask my kids.
Only one (eldest daughter) had a clear understanding of the event, and she had learned about it from her US on-line buddies.
Youngest daughter had no knowledge, but did remember Neil Young's song - but then, she's very much into music.
Eldest son remembered the Pulitzer winning image, but wasn't sure of the context.
Youngest son had heard of Kent State, but again was ignorant of the context, and he's the history buff.
Interesting.....

Trump's True Colours

There are times when I wonder about the mentality of a large component of the US population.

In case you haven't heard, there is an idiot (not a word I often use) currently trying for the Republican nomination for President of the United States.

This week he ridiculed a person with a disability at a public rally in South Carolina.

The person he ridiculed has a condition called arthrogryposis.

Arthrogryposis would have to be one of the most cruel of the many congenital disabilities around. It varies in severity, but is painful, interferes grossly with independence and cannot be fixed, although prolonged and continuous reconstructive surgery can help.

I have worked with a couple of kids with this condition down through the years, and have admired the guts and determination displayed by them and their families.

It occurred to me that if Trump had made the remarks publicly in the small western community where one of these kids lives, in this country he would have been tarred and feathered.

But this, of course, is Australia, not the United States of America.

Kilcullen on ISIS

Since the Paris attacks, there's been an avalanche of comment on both social and mainstream media about the ISIS threat and how to deal with it.

Much of this comment is knee jerk, tribal, and a reflection of the depth of ignorance the Australian public has for both the history and the reality of this phenomenon.

If you're going to get into comment about current events, it's always useful to first identify individuals who have real experience of the issues in hand, knowledge gained through years of painstaking research, and the capacity to communicate this knowledge and experience clearly and succinctly.

Then you should probably read and consider their writings on the subject before making public comment..

David Kilcullen is such an individual.

His resume - (from Wikipaedia)
  
Kilcullen graduated from St Pius X College in 1984. He then attended the Australian Defence Force Academy and completed a Bachelor of Arts with Honours in Military Art and Science through the University of New South Wales and graduated as a Distinguished Graduate and was awarded the Chief of Defence Force Army Prize in 1989. He took his army officer training at the Royal Military College Duntroon. After twelve months of training in Indonesia, Kilcullen graduated from the Australian Defence Force School of Languages in 1993 with an Advanced Diploma in Applied Linguistics.  He is fluent in Indonesian and speaks some Arabic and French. 

Kilcullen received a PhD in politics from ADFA at UNSW in 2000. His thesis, entitled "The Political Consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia 1945-99: A Fieldwork Analysis of the Political Power-Diffusion Effects of Guerrilla Conflict," focused on the effects of guerrilla warfare on non-state political systems in traditional societies. 

His research centered on investigating power diffusion in Indonesia during the Darul Islam Era of 1948 to 1962 and the Indonesian occupation of East Timor f 1974 to 1999. Kilcullen argues that counter-insurgency operations, whether successful or not, cause the diffusion of political power from central to local leaders and that populations are the major actors in insurgency and counter-insurgency dynamics.

Kilcullen was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the Australian Army and served in a number of operational, strategic, command, and staff positions in the Royal Australian Infantry Corps and Australian Defence Force. He served in several counter-insurgency and peacekeeping operations in East Timor,  Bougainville, and the Middle East. Kilcullen attained the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the Australian Army and served as a Staff Officer in ADF headquarters,. In 2004, he became a Senior Analyst in the Australian Office of National Assessment, where he served on the writing team for the Australian Government's 2004 Terrorism White Paper, "Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia".

He left active duty in 2005 and is commissioned as a Lieutenant Colonel in the Australian Army Reserve.

 David Kilcullen was a senior advisor to General David Petraeus in 2007 and 2008, when he helped to design and monitor the Iraq War troop “surge”. He was then a special advisor for counterinsurgency to US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. From 2005 to 2006, he was Chief Strategist in the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the US State Department. He has also been an adviser to the British government, the Australian government, NATO and the International Security Assistance Force. He is a former Australian Army officer and the author of three acclaimed books: The Accidental Guerrilla, Counterinsurgency and Out of the Mountains.

The following are extracts from his Quarterly Essay 58 -  Blood Year - Terrorism and the Islamic State.  

(You can purchase the E-book for $9.99. It's worth the read).

I've divided the extracts on the basis of theme. Kilcullen's text is in italics. Regular font is my summary.

Blame -

As I've explained, there's plenty of blame to go around. President Bush conflated enemies, defaulted to attacking states rather than thinking about how to deal with non-state actors, and - mother of all errors - invaded Iraq, and then botched the occupation.

President Obama compounded Bush's errors - pulling out without putting in enough effort to cement the gains of the surge, acting opportunistically in Libya, remaining passive in the face of massacre in Syria. (p230)

Responsibility -

After 2003 in Iraq, Western powers had a legal and ethical obligation to stabilise the society we'd disrupted, establish a successor government to the regime we'd overthrown, protect an innocent population we'd put massively at risk, and rebuild the economy and infrastructure we'd shattered. (p272)

Politicians acting tough -

..it's a criticism of decision-makers (usually, though not always, sitting in safety thousands of miles away, who've never heard a shot fired in anger) who succumb to the allure of Predator Porn, misusing these strategic assets - which should be applied sparingly as part of a broader plan - as tactical tools, to substitute for lack of strategic thought, or (worse) who send others in harm's way to make themselves look tough.

(p306)

What to do -

Militarily -

1. Ramp up the air strikes to a level resembling Kosovo and Libya. This may require forward observers on the ground.

2. Use the existing deployment differently. Get them out of the training bases and give them the authority to fight offensively.

Politically -

Hence a critical counterpart to the "war strategy" to neutralize ISIS in Iraq is a peace strategy in Syria - to end the slaughter by convincing all players that they can't achieve their goals through continued conflict, and that their best alternative is a negotiated peace. As in Bosnia, Kosovo and Libya, there may be a role here for the military, (specifically, air power): creating humanitarian corridors and no-fly zones, or inflicting sufficient damage on armed forces to force a ceasefire. But ultimately this is a political problem - and it will demand at least as much strategic effort and attention as the military problem in Iraq. (p328)

Conclusions -

1. We are living in an era of persistent conflict.

2. We need to remove ISIS as a state like entity using a larger more intense commitment, (though emphatically not an occupation or a counter insurgency campaign).

3. International engagement is a necessity. It's an international problem.

4. We need a strategy that recognises global terrorism for the threat it is, but doesn't treat it as if it's our only security issue. Between the overreaction of 2001-04 and the passivity of 2008 onwards, we need to find a middle ground.

He concludes -

Preserving and strengthening the political will of our societies, the will to continue this struggle without giving in to an horrific adversary, but also without surrounding our civil liberties or betraying our ethics, is not an adjunct to the strategy, it is the strategy. (p339)  

Pretty sobering reading, especially the reference to "an era of persistent conflict".

It takes me back to 2003, when, as Australian troops were being committed to the invasion of Iraq, I publicly refused to accept my National Service Medal from old mate Ian Macfarlane. This was my small protest against two things.

The first was being used as an ex-servicemen to justify a poor strategic decision. The second was the nature of the decision itself - a decision that emanated from Washington, not Canberra.

As Kilcullen has written - that decision was "the mother of all errors".



  

Bolt Verbals Aly

I had to post this.

It explains the strategy that ISIS uses. It also describes the dumbfounding stupidity of much of the response that we see from the likes of Bolt and Hanson.

It's fortunate that we have people with the courage and charisma of Waleed Aly prepared to state this publicly.

Bolt writes that Aly is using "excuses and evasions".

Bolt hasn't read the transcript of Aly's discussion, because if he had, be would have read this -

We all need to come together. I know how that sounds. I know it is a cliche, but it is also true because it is exactly what ISIL doesn’t want.  

So, if you are a member of Parliament or a has-been member of Parliament preaching hate at a time when what we actually need is more love — you are helping ISIL. They have told us that. If you are a Muslim leader telling your community they have no place here or basically them saying the same thing — you are helping ISIL. 

They have told us that. If you are just someone with a Facebook or Twitter account firing off misguided messages of hate, you are helping ISIL — They have told us that.

I am pretty sure that right now none of us wants to help these b*stards.” 

That to me, doesn't sound like making excuses. It's also pretty clear that he's not being evasive. In fact he's dealing with the issues head on. 

But Bolt has always verballed anyone he doesn't agree with. His readers are often too lazy to check what those he verbals actually wrote or said.

When this fact checking is done carefully and forensically (as it was in Bromberg's judgement), he is revealed as an opionista, not a commentator.  

As a commentator, he is incompetent. He may have a calling as an entertainer, perhaps as a comedian.

Des supporters chantent la Marseillaise

The attacks in Paris are front and centre right now in both social and mainstream media.

These are tragic and terrible events, but unfortunately, because of the various agendas, they are rapidly becoming ideological currency. Surely, the most adult response is one of sympathy and support for the people of Paris, and there has been plenty of that.

But there is also a gearing up of those who seek to exploit. Some of this is political, some of it financial, and some quite calculated.

A very good example of the latter, is Andrew Bolt's securing of Tony Abbott on his show tomorrow. It reminded me of Bolt's reaction when Anders Breivik went on his rampage in Norway. Bolt's initial conjecture that the massacre was inspired by Islam was likewise cynically exploitative until he discovered the truth.

The quick removal of those references from his blog website broke all records. He has obviously learned nothing.

 It is clear that a response that generates fear and loathing is exactly the goal of those committing these atrocities. Basically, when some dimwits advocate military intervention (often nuclear) they are playing into the hands of the terrorists. They make them powerful.

 The term "useful idiots" is often used by these same dimwits. They should, very occasionally, use a mirror.

Or perhaps, they should read a little history. Military intervention empowers an asymmetric threat. See Vietnam, Cambodia and Iraq.

Perhaps the best response was shown by the French crowd in the still from the video above. As they left the stadium after the attack, they sang the Marseillaise.

We Are Amused

Sometimes you come across an animation which is worth posting only because it is an excellent example of the art.

This is such an animation.

It's also bloody funny......

Bridge of Spies

Image courtesy eonline.com

I've never reviewed a movie on this humble blog, gentle reader.

This post will remedy that omission.

The movie (or "film" as people of my generation call it) is Bridge of Spies, a 2015 American Historical drama-thriller directed by Steven Spielberg and written by Matt Charman from Ethan and Joel Coen's screenplay.

The film stars Tom Hanks, Mark Rylance, Amy Ryan and Alan Alda. 

Here, straight from the Wiki, is the plot. Obviously, don't read on if you're put off by spoilers.

In 1957 Brooklyn, New York, Rudolf Abel retrieves a secret message from a park bench and reads it just before FBI agents burst into his rented room. He prevents discovery of the message, but other evidence in the room leads to his arrest and prosecution as a Soviet spy. James B Donovan, a lawyer who specializes in insurance settlements, is asked by his partners to take on Abel's defense. The United States believe that Abel is a KGB spy, but want him to have a fair trial to reduce the Soviet Union's chance to use it for propaganda. Donovan meets with Abel in prison, where the Russian agrees to accept his help. Abel refuses to cooperate with the US government on any revelations of the intelligence world.

Although Donovan takes his work seriously, no one—including the prosecuting attorneys, the judge, his firm, or his family—expects him to mount a strong defense of Abel. His efforts to seek acquittal are met with shock and anger by the American public; he is deluged with hate mail and his life is threatened, but he continues to fight.

Abel is found guilty of all charges, but Donovan convinces the judge to sentence him to 30 years imprisonment, rather than death, on the grounds that Abel may one day be valuable as a bargaining chip with the USSR. Donovan subsequently appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court that the evidence presented by the prosecution is tainted by an invalid search warrant, but loses 5–4.

In the meantime, Francis Gary Powers goes on a U-2 spy plane sortie over the Soviet Union, where he is shot down and captured.  He is convicted and subjected to interrogation. Frederic Pryor, an American economics graduate student, visits his German girlfriend in East Berlin just as the Berlin Wall is being built. He tries to bring her back into West Berlin, but is stopped by Stasi agents and arrested as a spy.

The USSR sends a backchannel message to Donovan, via a false letter to Abel from his "family," proposing a prisoner exchange: Abel for Powers. Donovan has heard of Pryor's capture and insists on a 2-for-1 exchange instead. Though the CIA is interested only in Powers' return, it allows Donovan to negotiate for Pryor as well, on condition that the Abel-for-Powers deal is not jeopardized.

The East German government, which is holding Pryor, suddenly pulls out, insulted that Donovan did not inform them that the USSR was a party to the negotiation. The CIA wants to leave Pryor behind and finish the exchange. Donovan threatens East Germany by saying unless Pryor is returned, the entire deal will be scrapped and Abel interrogated, and the USSR will blame East Germany for any damage. East Germany capitulates, and the exchange is conducted, freeing the three men. Donovan gains credit for his achievement.

So it's a great tight narrative, and is based solidly in fact.

As a spectacle, the movie is bereft of special effects (with the possible exception of the depiction of the shooting down of Powers' U2), but it's all the better for that.

The cinematography is first class, and captures the atmospherics of the time with vivid accuracy. There is not a great deal of action, as such, but the dialogue is brilliantly sharp.

The actual historical events have plenty of relevance today. Put the situation of the inmates of Guantanamo Bay beside that of Rudolf Abel, and there is a startling connect. Donovan points out at one stage, when he is vilified for defending Abel, that the right to a fair trial is one of the values that separates the USA from the totalitarian USSR.

Exactly the same principle was shoved aside when Bush and the Neocons sent accused terrorists to Guantanamo Bay.

I was riveted by the narrative and the characterisation of Donovan as a "standing man"*.

The critics apparently liked it as well. Make sure you take the time to see it.

Bridge of Spies is showing right now all over the country.

* You'll have to watch the movie to get this reference.