Time for a book review. I haven’t done one for yonks.
The book is Fighting
to the Finish by Ashley Elkins and Ian McNeill. McNeill died in 1998, and
his co-author completed the work, although McNeill had already been honoured
with the Templer medal for To Long Tan.
It’s not the sort of book you’d read for entertainment, but
if you’re after a defining account of the ground war for the Australians from
1968 until 1975, this is the best you’ll get. If you want to restrict your
reading about Vietnam to two books, this one, and Paul Ham’s Vietnam, the Australian War would cover
it.,
It’s structured generally as a chronology, but there are
subheadings that deal in detail with aspects of the conflict – most of them
fascinating diversions into detail.
Despite being written as a military history, it’s not so technical
that it ever becomes dense. Perhaps my personal involvement contributed but I
found it riveting, and I read it in about three days. Given it’s about 1000
pages, that’s noteworthy.
It pulls no punches, particularly in its descriptions of the
conflict between the then government and the military. The overall impression
is of political decisions being made with absolutely no consideration for the
interests of the military, and no heed taken of their concerns.
This was obviously the case both in terms of how we were
involved in the first place, but some of the shenanigans that went on around
the Australian withdrawal are breathtaking.
In fact, the government of the day indulged in shenanigans both
on the way into Vietnam, and on the way out again -
Some
quotes –
On 29 April 1965, when Prime Minister Robert
Menzies announced his government's
decision to commit the first battalion of Australian
combat troops to South Vietnam,
he said this was in response to a request from
the South Vietnamese Government.
Questioning of this basis for the commitment
had begun well before the war ended.
June 1971, the New York Times published leaked extracts from a secret US Defense
Department study of American involvement in
Indochina that became known as the
Pentagon Papers. Australian newspapers picked
up the story, focusing on evidence
the reports that suggested the supposed request
from South Vietnam in 1965 was
‘manufactured' and that
the Menzies government had deceived the Australian people. (p689)
So we went in on a lie.
And on the withdrawal -
On 18 August, Prime Minister McMahon
announced his government's decision
withdraw the task force from Vietnam." Hanoi's
plans to overrun the Republic
Vietnam had been 'frustrated', McMahon
assured parliament, and 'changing and
improving circumstances' now allowed 'all
remaining Australian combat forces' to
return to Australia. The enemy threat
remained in Phuoc Tuy, he conceded, and
'some setbacks may yet occur'; but the enemy
had 'largely lost the initiative' and
South Vietnamese 'territorial forces should
be able to handle the likely contingencies'.
Most Australian combat troops would be home
by Christmas; stores and equipment
would follow early in 1972. 'In compensation,
the government pledged A$25 million
military and civil aid to South Vietnam over
the next three years. There were also
plans to retain some military training and
advisory elements, such as instructors in
Jungle Warfare Training Centre.
This was contrary to the army's advice
against leaving an Australian residual force,
which could not be adequately protected and
might become a prime target for the
enemy. In an echo of the army's initial 'one
out, all out' policy, Major General Graham,
Deputy CGS, had earlier signalled Dunstan in
Saigon: 'It will be in best interests of
army to make a clean break'.
(p 603)
And
we went out on a lie - but the enemy
had 'largely lost the initiative' and
And the way it was done was against the advice of the
military.
South Vietnamese 'territorial forces should
be able to handle the likely contingencies' - was BS and the government knew it, but the tide of public opinion had turned against the commitment, and the Coalition was covering its backside.
There’s
also a lot of interesting background about the tensions between the American
military hierarchy and our own. Generally, various task force commanders were
continually at odds with the Americans on how the war should be fought.
Fortunately
for the sixty thousand or so Australians involved, our commanders usually
prevailed.
That's me standing on the far right - looking pissed off as usual. |
So I’d
recommend it. Having said that, you have to shell out $100 to buy it. Maybe it’s
one of those books best borrowed from a library.
I had
to buy it of course – I appear in two pictures – both taken by that genius of
photography, Denis Gibbons.
Anyway, that’s
my excuse for buying it.
It's available on-line from the AWM.
Update - I've just noticed an error in the caption to the bottom pic. It should read "5 platoon, B company" not "5 platoon, D company".
Update - I've just noticed an error in the caption to the bottom pic. It should read "5 platoon, B company" not "5 platoon, D company".